Game Analysis on Product Safety Input of Fresh Agricultural Supply Chain Upstream

Haoxiong Yang (), Dan Wang, Jingrui Zhang () and Jindan Li
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Haoxiong Yang: Beijing Technology and Business University
Dan Wang: Beijing Technology and Business University
Jingrui Zhang: Beijing Technology and Business University
Jindan Li: Beijing Technology and Business University

A chapter in LISS 2014, 2015, pp 1613-1619 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract This paper address the quantitative description on enterprises’ safety input behavior and take into account three kinds of game model based on agricultural product safety input of the farmers and agro-processing enterprises in the fresh agricultural supply chain. Studies show that in the case of cooperation, the income of enterprises is higher than that in non-cooperation, but also in the more realistic situation, Bayesian equilibrium, the safety input level of both sides is proportional to the probability of cooperation that the counterpart takes.

Keywords: Safety input; Nash equilibrium; Pareto equilibrium; Game theory; Fresh agricultural products (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:sprchp:978-3-662-43871-8_232

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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-662-43871-8_232

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