Supply Chain Contract Design of Technology Innovation Collaboration Under Asymmetric Information

Na Wang (), Zhenji Zhang () and Ruize Gao ()
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Na Wang: Beijing Jiaotong University
Zhenji Zhang: Beijing Jiaotong University
Ruize Gao: Beijing Jiaotong University

A chapter in LISS 2014, 2015, pp 259-265 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract Supply chain technology innovation collaboration has the characteristics of high uncertainty and risk. Through the equitable distribution of the proceeds compact design can enhance supply chain competitive advantages and help achieve maximum benefit. It assumes a case study of technology innovation collaboration in a manufacturing enterprise, of which the enterprises’ strength and effort level are asymmetric information. This paper firstly analysis the enterprises’ profit-sharing issues in the supply chain through dynamic game. Then it creates the collaborative model with principal-agent theory, and studies the game strategy of cooperative innovation. The research is expected to provide a theoretical support for supply chain enterprises, to help the enterprises grasp the cooperative innovation rules, formulate the technology innovation collaboration strategy and improve the overall competitiveness.

Keywords: Supply chain; Technology innovation collaboration; Asymmetric information; Dynamic game; Principal-agent theory; Contract design (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:sprchp:978-3-662-43871-8_40

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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-662-43871-8_40

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