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Revenue Sharing Contract Design with Marketing Strategy Types of Suppliers

Hua He (), Xin Fang and Yinfeng Du ()
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Hua He: Southwest Jiaotong University
Xin Fang: Southwest Jiaotong University
Yinfeng Du: Tian Fu College of Southwestern University of Finance and Economics

A chapter in LISS 2014, 2015, pp 275-280 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract In this article, research revenue sharing contract design when a supplier is leader and a retailer is follower in a two echelon supply chain. We differ from previous research all assume the supplier and retailer both profit oriented by distinguishing the marketing strategies of supplier. The marketing strategies include two types: profit oriented and sales oriented. The analysis results show the revenue sharing contract can achieve supply chain coordination and Pareto optimality in the supply chain with profit oriented suppliers; In the supply chain with sales oriented supplier, revenue sharing contract can obtain supply chain collaboration solutions and the Pareto improvement for the supplier and the retailer when the retailer’s order quantity is in a certain range. But only get the supply chain collaboration solution when the retailer’s order quantity is beyond the range.

Keywords: Revenue sharing contract; Marketing strategy; Supply chain coordination; Pareto optimality (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:sprchp:978-3-662-43871-8_42

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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-662-43871-8_42

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