A Brief Analysis of Bargain-Huntingin Gold: Based on Signaling Game Model

Wenzhe Xiong () and Ying Ren ()
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Wenzhe Xiong: Central University of Finance and Economics
Ying Ren: Beijing Jiaotong University

A chapter in LISS 2014, 2015, pp 463-467 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract Individual Chinese gold investors have progressively invested in gold recently, since they believe it is a good time to bargain hunt in gold. This essay will build up signaling game model to analyze weather it is reasonable and profitable to invest in gold under present economic and financial condition, and thus draw a conclusion that under which circumstance Chinese investors can benefit from gold-investment. In order to explicate the point of essay effectively, we simplify the model and add some necessary assumptions.

Keywords: Signaling game model; Gold market; Gold price (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:sprchp:978-3-662-43871-8_67

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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-662-43871-8_67

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