Study on the Project Supervision System Based on the Theory of Information Economics

Hongnan Zhuang () and Runtong Zhang ()
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Hongnan Zhuang: Beijing Jiaotong University
Runtong Zhang: Beijing Jiaotong University

A chapter in LISS 2014, 2015, pp 551-556 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract This paper presents the problems in the current project management system firstly. Then it analyzes the principal-agent relationship between the owner and supervisor with “principal-agent theory”. The owner has private information about the project profitability and exerts an unobservable level of effort. The incentive contract plays an important role in reducing the moral hazard. At last, the paper validates the model through two project cases.

Keywords: Project supervision; Asymmetric information; Principal-agent (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:sprchp:978-3-662-43871-8_79

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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-662-43871-8_79

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