Cross-Border Behaviors as Games

Rongxing Guo ()

Chapter 7 in Cross-Border Management, 2015, pp 135-156 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract A cross-border system, which is governed by two or more independent players, is divided by various man-made boundaries—either physically visible or invisible. In this system, all players interact with each other. The elements of each sub-system, which include various political, economic and cultural factors, are correlated with each other in sequence. The whole system provides a very complicated function with respect to the locations. The interactions between the various elements are complex. In addition, the cross-border system is sometimes integrated and dynamic. The former emphasizes that all players are interdependent, whereas the latter describes the relationship between the state and time of system. In short, the spatial and institutional features of cross-border issues require specialized analytical tools.

Keywords: Nash Equilibrium; Cooperative Game; Linear Programming Model; Subgame Perfect Equilibrium; Maximum Sustainable Yield (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:sprchp:978-3-662-45156-4_7

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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-662-45156-4_7

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