Alternative Strategies for Dispute Resolution

Rongxing Guo ()

Chapter 9 in Cross-Border Management, 2015, pp 179-203 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract Regardless of various disagreements or disputes throughout the world, compromise may become possible because claims over disputed properties carry both benefits and costs. When these costs outweigh the value of contestation, compromise becomes more attractive than confrontation. The cost a stakeholder bears for pressing cross-border disputes opens a bargaining space in which concessions can be exchanged for other goals that a stakeholder may seek. When the bilateral (or multilateral) ties between the stakeholders become more important, cooperation in and delaying the settlement of their cross-border disputes will become more attractive than continuing to press claims. However, dispute resolution and cross-border cooperation cannot be achieved automatically. The style of settlement or negotiation also matters.

Keywords: International Criminal Court; Exclusive Economic Zone; Territorial Dispute; Arbitral Award; International Arbitration (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:sprchp:978-3-662-45156-4_9

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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-662-45156-4_9

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