Analysis of the Relationship Between Optimal Incentive Plan and Supervision Cost

Peng Mao (), Bingqing Jiang (), Xia Yao () and Sishuo Li ()
Additional contact information
Peng Mao: Nanjing Forestry University
Bingqing Jiang: Nanjing Forestry University
Xia Yao: Nanjing Forestry University
Sishuo Li: Nanjing Forestry University

Chapter Chapter 101 in Proceedings of the 19th International Symposium on Advancement of Construction Management and Real Estate, 2015, pp 1207-1217 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract There are principal-agent relationships between owners and engineers in the practices of construction supervision. Because of the inconsistency of their goals and the asymmetry of information, fixed supervision cost can not effectively produce incentives for the engineers’ effort. Firstly we assumed that the information is symmetrical and analyzed the fixed supervision cost mechanism based on the principal-agent theory. Furthermore, the incentive mechanism under the condition of information asymmetry was analyzed, and the finding was that an optimal incentive plan should adopt floating supervision cost mechanism.

Keywords: Construction supervision; Principal-agent; Incentive mechanism (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:sprchp:978-3-662-46994-1_101

Ordering information: This item can be ordered from
http://www.springer.com/9783662469941

DOI: 10.1007/978-3-662-46994-1_101

Access Statistics for this chapter

More chapters in Springer Books from Springer
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().