Imperfect Agency and Non-expected Utility Models

Stefan Felder (stefan.felder@unibas.ch) and Thomas Mayrhofer (thomas.mayrhofer@hochschule-stralsund.de)
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Stefan Felder: University of Basel
Thomas Mayrhofer: Stralsund University of Applied Sciences

Chapter Chapter 13 in Medical Decision Making, 2022, pp 279-299 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract In the final chapter, we take a more realistic stance on medical decision making by assuming that physicians are only imperfect agents of their patients. Specifically, we assume that physicians internalize only a share of the patient’s utility and follow a profit motive in their test and treatment decisions. We then analyze the effects of imperfect agency on the thresholds and discuss the role of liability rules and medical guidelines subject to imperfect agency. In this final chapter, non-expected utility models under risk and uncertainty (i.e., ambiguity) are also presented. While these models can explain observed test and treatment decisions, they are not suitable for normative analyses aimed at providing guidance on medical decision making.

Date: 2022
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:sprchp:978-3-662-64654-0_13

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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-662-64654-0_13

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