Railway Competition in a Park-and-Ride System

Tatsuaki Kuroda and Kazutoshi Miyazawa

Chapter 14. in Time and Space in Economics, 2007, pp 265-281 from Springer

Abstract: Summary The scale effect of city size and the cost advantage of railway over automobile use are examined for a simple park-and-ride commuter system. The main result is that the operation constraint (i.e., the budget constraint for a rail company) is more restrictive for a monopolistic competition equilibrium than for a kinked one. Hence, it is easily possible to construct a case in which the perverse characteristics of kinked equilibrium, e.g., “the larger a city, the greater the number of railways, and the higher the fare is,” could result in a troublesome situation for a park-and-ride system. In addition, the operational constraints might be most restrictive for the social optimal configuration rather than for other market solutions. As a result, railway subsidies may be necessary to balance the budget for a better configuration.

Keywords: Urban transportation; City size; Park and ride; Kinked equilibrium; Commuter railway (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:sprchp:978-4-431-45978-1_14

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DOI: 10.1007/978-4-431-45978-1_14

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