 The Traditional ViewJoseph D. Sneed Chapter Chapter II in The Logical Structure of Mathematical Physics, 1971, pp 15-40 from Springer Abstract: Abstract In this chapter one proposal — the simplest — for using a set-theoretic predicate to make an empirical claim is considered. Some attention is given to questions which arise in connection with this proposal, and proposals subsequently considered, as well. In this connection, the theory of measurement and the question of the “approximate” nature of claims in mathematical physics are discussed briefly. The proposal considered here is shown to be essentially equivalent to the view of how the theory’s statements are obtained from the set-theoretic predicate that was described in Chapter I. Considerable effort is devoted to characterizing a theory relative notion of theoretical term, independently of sweeping epistemological assumptions. This notion is then employed to describe a difficulty that could be encountered in attempting to employ the sentence form proposed here in logical reconstruction. Finally, an attempt is made to relate this difficulty to more traditional discussions of the problem of theoretical terms. Keywords: Mathematical Physic; Scientific Theory; Mathematical Structure; Traditional View; Logical Structure (search for similar items in EconPapers) There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it. Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:sprchp:978-94-010-3066-3_2 Ordering information: This item can be ordered from DOI: 10.1007/978-94-010-3066-3_2 Access Statistics for this chapter More chapters in Springer Books from Springer |
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