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Quasi-transitive Individual Preferences

Satish Kumar Jain ()
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Satish Kumar Jain: Jawaharlal Nehru University, Formerly Professor

Chapter Chapter 11 in Domain Conditions and Social Rationality, 2019, pp 159-187 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract This chapter is concerned with the class of neutral and monotonic binary social decision rules and some of its subclasses when individual weak preference relations are reflexive, connected and quasi-transitive rather than orderings. Given that the domain consists of all logically possible profiles of individual reflexive, connected and quasi-transitive weak preference relations, a characterization is provided for the class of neutral and monotonic binary social decision rules. Given that individual weak preference relations are reflexive, connected and quasi-transitive, conditions for quasi-transitivity are derived for the method of majority decision, the class of special majority rules, and the class of social decision rules which are simple games.

Date: 2019
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:sprchp:978-981-13-9672-4_11

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DOI: 10.1007/978-981-13-9672-4_11

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