Social Decision Rules Which Are Simple Games

Satish Kumar Jain ()
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Satish Kumar Jain: Jawaharlal Nehru University, Formerly Professor

Chapter Chapter 9 in Domain Conditions and Social Rationality, 2019, pp 129-138 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract A simple game social decision rule is defined by the condition that under it an alternative x is socially preferred to another alternative y iff all individuals belonging to some winning coalition unanimously prefer x to y. This chapter provides a characterization for the class of social decision rules that are simple games as well as for the subclass that are strong simple games and derives Inada-type necessary and sufficient conditions for transitivity and quasi-transitivity under the rules belonging to the class.

Date: 2019
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:sprchp:978-981-13-9672-4_9

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DOI: 10.1007/978-981-13-9672-4_9

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