Why Is Behavioral Game Theory a Game for Economists? The Concept of Beliefs in Equilibrium

Michiru Nagatsu () and Chiara Lisciandra
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Michiru Nagatsu: University of Helsinki
Chiara Lisciandra: University of Groningen

A chapter in A Genealogy of Self-Interest in Economics, 2021, pp 289-308 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract The interdisciplinary exchange between economists and psychologists has so far been more active and fruitful in the modifications of Expected Utility Theory than in those of Game Theory. We argue that this asymmetry may be explained by economists’ specific way of doing equilibrium analysis of aggregate-level outcomes in their practice, and by psychologists’ reluctance to fully engage with such practice. We focus on the notion of belief that is embedded in economists’ practice of equilibrium analysis, more specifically Nash equilibrium, and argue that its difference from the psychological counterpart is one of the factors that makes interdisciplinary exchange in behavioral game theory more difficult.

Date: 2021
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:sprchp:978-981-15-9395-6_17

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DOI: 10.1007/978-981-15-9395-6_17

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