Bentham on Self-interest: Institutional Control of Self-interest

Hiroaki Itai ()
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Hiroaki Itai: Ochanomizu University

A chapter in A Genealogy of Self-Interest in Economics, 2021, pp 61-83 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract I examine Jeremy Bentham on self-interest. The originality of Bentham’s utilitarianism seems clear, and he was not particularly concerned with the problems of selfishness. He presupposes the existing social order, and assumes that it does not matter whether human beings are selfish or altruistic, since, as he himself acknowledged, a utilitarian system of governance transforms people into agents of appropriate utilitarian accounting and maximizes social well-being. While people are free to the extent that they do not harm others, delinquency and misrule, which impede the growth of social well-being, are controlled both through oversight, and through physical mechanisms such as the Panopticon, by legislators, and the general public. In this sense, Bentham may have changed the liberal tradition’s way of considering selfishness.

Keywords: Utilitarianism; Hedonism; Publicity; Enlightenment; Surveillance (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:sprchp:978-981-15-9395-6_5

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DOI: 10.1007/978-981-15-9395-6_5

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