Basic Game Theory III: Games with Incomplete Information

Takashi Hayashi ()
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Takashi Hayashi: University of Glasgow

Chapter Chapter 24 in Microeconomic Theory for the Social Sciences, 2021, pp 377-384 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract Until the previous chapter I have assumed that all the players or market participants have the same information. This assumption is called complete information. It means for example that firms know each other’s cost function, sellers know buyers’ willingness to pay, buyers’ know the qualities of the items being sold, bidders know each other’s valuation of the item, and so on.

Date: 2021
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DOI: 10.1007/978-981-16-3541-0_24

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