Auction

Takashi Hayashi ()
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Takashi Hayashi: University of Glasgow

Chapter Chapter 25 in Microeconomic Theory for the Social Sciences, 2021, pp 385-399 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract I focus on the case that a single item is being sold and buyers bid. Like procurement auctions we can consider that the sellers bid, but it can be treated by flipping the direction in the arguments below.

Date: 2021
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:sprchp:978-981-16-3541-0_25

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DOI: 10.1007/978-981-16-3541-0_25

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