Trade with Incomplete Information

Takashi Hayashi ()
Additional contact information
Takashi Hayashi: University of Glasgow

Chapter Chapter 26 in Microeconomic Theory for the Social Sciences, 2021, pp 401-424 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract Many kinds of information such as quality of goods, ability of workers and consumers’ preferences or willingness to pay are private information which are not observable or verifiable by other market participants. Trades which are smoothly done under complete information are likely to fail under such types of incomplete information. We can roughly think of two kinds of such situations, one is adverse selection and the other is moral hazard.

Date: 2021
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:sprchp:978-981-16-3541-0_26

Ordering information: This item can be ordered from
http://www.springer.com/9789811635410

DOI: 10.1007/978-981-16-3541-0_26

Access Statistics for this chapter

More chapters in Springer Books from Springer
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().