Research on the Competitive Mechanism Between Long-Term Rental Apartment and Traditional House Rental from the Perspective of Game Theory

Hui Liu ()
Additional contact information
Hui Liu: Shenzhen University

A chapter in Proceedings of the 25th International Symposium on Advancement of Construction Management and Real Estate, 2021, pp 469-483 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract After our country has repeatedly issued favorable policies on housing rental, long-term rental apartments have emerged at the current development of sharing economy. Long-term rental apartments have so many advantages traditional housing rental does not have that it is favored by the young generation. Although the permeability of long-term rental apartments is still relatively low compared with traditional house rental in the market, to a certain extent, the former affects the interests of the latter. The industry is increasingly divided. The emergence of “oligopoly” with strong comprehensive strength has become a new trend in the industry. Therefore, the emergence and development of long-term rental apartments will occupy the traditional housing rental market share. Based on the comparative analysis of their business models and rental prices, this paper establishes the dynamic game model of both in the long rent real estate market and the return equilibrium solution of the game is obtained by inverse induction. In this theory, this paper puts forward the competitive strategy of long-term rental apartments in the future real estate storage quantity market to make an effective balance between the steady operation of leasing and scale expansion.

Keywords: Long-term rental apartment; Traditional house rental; Competition mechanism; Game theory (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:sprchp:978-981-16-3587-8_31

Ordering information: This item can be ordered from
http://www.springer.com/9789811635878

DOI: 10.1007/978-981-16-3587-8_31

Access Statistics for this chapter

More chapters in Springer Books from Springer
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().