Game Analysis of China’s Enterprise M&A Pricing Based on Expected Market Excess Reward

Yan Wang ()
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Yan Wang: Guangdong University of Foreign Studies (GDUFS)

Chapter Chapter 6 in Exploring the Trust and Innovation Mechanisms in M&A of China’s State Owned Enterprises with Mixed Ownership, 2021, pp 189-209 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract This paper examines the incomplete information game between merger and acquisition (M&A) parties, constructing a game model of transaction pricing and expected market excess returns. Based on the perspective of the acquirer, M&A experience data from Chinese A-share listed companies are used to conduct an empirical test of the game model, with findings indicating that transaction pricing is the focus of the M&A game.

Date: 2021
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:sprchp:978-981-16-4404-7_6

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DOI: 10.1007/978-981-16-4404-7_6

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