Financial Derivatives: Generals, Board Roles and Scandals

Tran Thi Hong Lien ()
Additional contact information
Tran Thi Hong Lien: Vietnam National University—Ho Chi Minh City

Chapter Chapter 3 in Board Directors, Financial Derivatives, and Corporate Governance: The Case of Vietnam, 2022, pp 53-71 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract How are directors’ competencies called on in decisions on financial derivatives? To answer this, this chapter summarises the nature of financial derivatives and their necessity for business, and consider directors’ knowledge of these instruments. For boards to be effective, board members need to be competent, but it is impossible to ensure that all directors on a board are similarly competent about all issues at hand. However, to make effective judgements, directors at least need to be informed fully about the critical issues. Financial derivatives are controversial but are attractive to businesses in many nations. The weaknesses of boards in general and directors in particular in dealing with derivatives are common in developed markets and have been exposed to the public in notorious scandals in a single company, in a single country and in nations.

Date: 2022
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:sprchp:978-981-19-1400-3_3

Ordering information: This item can be ordered from
http://www.springer.com/9789811914003

DOI: 10.1007/978-981-19-1400-3_3

Access Statistics for this chapter

More chapters in Springer Books from Springer
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().