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Does Political Affirmative Action Work, and for Whom? Theory and Evidence on India’s Scheduled Areas

Saad Gulzar (gulzar@princeton.edu), Nicholas Haas (nick.haas@ps.au.dk) and Benjamin Pasquale (bjpasquale@gmail.com)
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Saad Gulzar: Princeton University
Nicholas Haas: Aarhus University

Chapter 32 in Handbook on Economics of Discrimination and Affirmative Action, 2023, pp 729-759 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract Does political affirmative action undermine or promote development? We present the first systematic analysis of Scheduled Areas in India, home to 100 million, where local political office is reserved for the historically disadvantaged Scheduled Tribes. A newly constructed dataset of 217,000 villages allows us to probe conflicting hypotheses on the implementation of the world’s largest workfare program, the National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme. We find that reservations deliver no worse overall outcomes, that there are large gains for targeted minorities, and that these gains come at the cost of the relatively privileged, not other minorities. We also find improvements in other pro-poor programs, including a rural roads program and general public goods. Reservations more closely align benefits to each group’s population share, allaying concerns of overcompensation for inequalities. Contrary to the expectations of skeptics, results indicate that affirmative action can redistribute both political and economic power without hindering overall development.

Keywords: Affirmative action; Electoral quota; Scheduled Areas; Scheduled Tribes; Scheduled Castes; Employment; Public goods; India (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:sprchp:978-981-19-4166-5_51

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DOI: 10.1007/978-981-19-4166-5_51

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