Financing Schemes in Supply Chains with a Capital-Constrained Supplier: Coopetition and Risk

Danqin Yang (), Jiani Ding () and Nan Yan
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Danqin Yang: Nanjing University of Science and Technology
Jiani Ding: Nanjing University of Science and Technology
Nan Yan: Nanjing University of Science and Technology

A chapter in LISS 2020, 2021, pp 461-475 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract In this paper, we consider a small capital-constrained supplier that can finance from a bank or a peer supplier or a downstream manufacturer in a supply chain. We use a game-theoretical model to analyze different financing schemes. Through analytical comparison, we find that the small supplier will always choose purchase order financing when the production cost is low. As the production cost increases, the internal financing (buyer direct financing and peer financing) dominates external financing.

Keywords: Supply chain finance; Game theory; Buyer direct financing; Purchase order financing; Peering financing (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:sprchp:978-981-33-4359-7_33

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DOI: 10.1007/978-981-33-4359-7_33

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