Stackelberg Game Model of Power Plants and Large Users Considering Carbon Trading

Xinyu Niu () and Shifeng Liu ()
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Xinyu Niu: Beijing Jiaotong University
Shifeng Liu: Beijing Jiaotong University

A chapter in LISS 2020, 2021, pp 837-848 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract Bilateral transactions are widely used in the power market in the context of power reform and low-carbon power, and more and more users can directly sign bilateral contracts with power plants to purchase power. This paper studies the issue of bilateral transactions between multiple power generators and large users based on the carbon trading background. The power generators first gave a quotation, and the large users then decided the stackelberg game problem of the contract power. The results show that the existence of a Nash equilibrium solution for multiple units quoting at the same time, and an algorithm for determining the contract power of large users and the initial price of units is given. This study of strategic behavior can provide theoretical support for decision-making of power plants and large users, and provide theoretical support for the bilateral negotiation between the unit and large users.

Keywords: Spot electricity market; Bilateral transaction; Stackelberg game; Carbon trading (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:sprchp:978-981-33-4359-7_58

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DOI: 10.1007/978-981-33-4359-7_58

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