 Russian Presence in Syria: Gulf States ViewsSinan Hatahet ()
Chapter Chapter 10 in Russia’s Relations with the GCC and Iran, 2021, pp 229-248 from Springer Abstract: Abstract Russia’s initial diplomatic support to Assad was motivated by the need to preserve its international status after NATO’s perceived betrayal in Libya, but Moscow involvement grew as it identified the Syrian conflict as an opportunity to redefine its role as a power broker in the Middle East. The Russian military intervention in September 2015 came in a crucial time when the Syrian regime was on the verge of collapsing, its air forces were not only decisive in preventing the Syrian opposition groups from overthrowing Assad, but it was also instrumental in altering the landscape of the regional stance vis-à-vis regime change in the war-torn country. Russia has mainly benefited from its position as an outsider to the region to place itself above regional competition and rivalries. Using a mix of diplomacy and military force, Russia portrayed itself as a seemingly more powerful and reliable substitute to the unresponsive and retreating USAUnited States (US). Frustrated with Washington indifference toward their geopolitical and security aims, US traditional allies in the MENA region sought Moscow instead to appease their concerns in SyriaSyria. Nevertheless, Moscow does not wish to solely take over the challenging job of stabilizing SyriaSyria. The Russian mission in Syria is best described as the establishment of a strong foothold in the Middle EastMiddle East at minimum cost. To achieve this goal, the Russian leadership is open to accommodate some of regional powers demands in Syria but only in exchange of burden sharing in owning the Syrian problem while recognizing Russia new role in the MENA. Moscow’s predisposition to engage others in Syria political and security new order is thus further encouraging the region’s capitals to recalibrate their policies toward Assad. More than ever, Russia seems to be the force to negotiate with in Syria. This paper attempts to evaluate Russia ability to pursue its Middle East grand strategy through its facilitator role in ending the Syrian conflict. It also looks at Moscow different maneuvers in appeasing IsraelIsrael, TurkeyTurkey, and GCCGulf Cooperation Council (GCC) concerns in SyriaSyria while maintaining a working partnership with IranIran and seeking tactical arrangements with the USAUnited States (US). The paper also studies the evolution of regional responses to the Russian intervention in Syria and its impact on broader foreign policy issues. Finally, it measures Moscow capacity to navigate through regional rivalries and the risk of getting caught in the complex net of conflicting interests in the country. Date: 2021 There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it. Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:sprchp:978-981-33-4730-4_10 Ordering information: This item can be ordered from DOI: 10.1007/978-981-33-4730-4_10 Access Statistics for this chapter More chapters in Springer Books from Springer |
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