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Understanding Global Governance

Yuyan Zhang ()
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Yuyan Zhang: Chinese Academy of Social Sciences

Chapter Chapter 10 in Reform, Opening-up and China's Changing Role in Global Governance, 2021, pp 235-240 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract Starting from Thomas Schelling’s theory, this paper examines the dilemma of collective action in global governance, including dealing with global issues and providing global public goods. Due to the stake-holding intensity and players’ capacity of different actors in the world, global governance takes different forms, achieves different results, and is either non-existent or inadequate. Global dominant players often use non-neutral public goods to attain more benefits at the expense of the interests of most stakeholders. Small-scale collective action and regional governance systems tend to uneven the balance between effectiveness and representativeness in global governance. Therefore, to pursue equilibrium governance, international organizations as major providers of global public goods need incentive compatibility through optimizing performance evaluation system. According to China’s Confucius Improvement, no country can be fully established and developed while others are not; to go forward is to go together.

Keywords: Global governance; Global public goods; Equilibrium governance (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:sprchp:978-981-33-6025-9_10

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DOI: 10.1007/978-981-33-6025-9_10

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