Risk-Sensitive Queueing Game

Jinting Wang ()
Additional contact information
Jinting Wang: Central University of Finance and Economics, School of Management Science and Engineering

Chapter Chapter 5 in Fundamentals of Queueing-Game Models, 2026, pp 79-108 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract In most of the past studies in the queueing-game literature, customers are assumed to be risk-neutral, making their decisions based on the expected monetary benefit of joining the queue. Such an assumption ignores the fact that customers may be risk-averse or even risk-seeking when making decisions under uncertain wait times. Chen and Frank (IIE Transactions, 36, 569–581, 2004) study the pricing problem of a monopolist in a queueing setting in both risk-neutral and risk-sensitive cases. They find that while equilibrium pricing and capacity strategy is socially efficient for the risk-neutral customer case, it is usually not socially efficient for the risk-sensitive case. Guo and Zipkin (Management Science, 53, 962–970, 2007) utilize a customers’ delay-risk sensitivity parameter to model the customers’ attitude towards the wait time.

Date: 2026
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:sprchp:978-981-95-0261-5_5

Ordering information: This item can be ordered from
http://www.springer.com/9789819502615

DOI: 10.1007/978-981-95-0261-5_5

Access Statistics for this chapter

More chapters in Springer Books from Springer
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().