Cartel Regulation in Korea

Seonghoon Jeon ()
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Seonghoon Jeon: Sogang University

Chapter Chapter 6 in Antitrust Policy in Korea, 2025, pp 255-308 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract This chapter provides a comprehensive examination of cartel regulation in Korea, beginning with an overview of its foundational legal and institutional frameworks. It then explores the economic rationale behind leniency programs, which are widely adopted to encourage self-reporting among cartel participants by offering incentives for cooperation with competition authorities. The analysis proceeds to address the methodological complexities involved in quantifying cartel damages, with particular attention to price overcharges and cost pass-through mechanisms. The chapter concludes with a review of significant cartel enforcement cases in Korea, those related to Military Oil Procurement in 2000, Graphite Electrodes in 2002, Flour in 2006, Credit Card/VAN in 2006, BMW/Lexus Dealers in 2008, Ramen in 2008, Industrial Explosives in 2015, Compound Feed in 2015, LNG Tank in 2016, Iron Scrap Purchase (2021), and Public Procurement of Reinforcing Bar in 2022.

Date: 2025
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:sprchp:978-981-95-0632-3_6

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DOI: 10.1007/978-981-95-0632-3_6

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