 Empathy in Strategic Decision MakingDebarshi Roy
Chapter Chapter 4 in Empathonomics, 2025, pp 69-93 from Springer Abstract: Abstract The discussion in this chapter finds its fundamental rationale within the essential difference between sympathy and empathy. While sympathy presents as a behaviour wherein individuals feel for others with a sense of kindness, consolation or solace, empathy can be described as feeling as the other. Sinclair et al. (2016) had explained that sympathy is an “emotional reaction of pity toward the misfortune of another, especially those who are perceived as suffering unfairly. In contrast, empathy has been defined as an ability to understand and accurately acknowledge the feelings of another, leading to an attuned response from the observer” (p. 438). The fundamental difference between the two constructs sometimes leads to differential outcomes; while sympathy may involve shallow and distant responses to others’ sufferings (Sinclair et al., 2016), it is most often overwhelmingly benevolent whereas empathy might not necessarily present with a benevolent intention. Chismar (1988) had explained that sympathy “entails having a positive regard or a non-fleeting concern for the other person. This would explain why to say, ‘I sympathize with you’ seems to suggest more support and compassion than, ‘I empathize with you’” (p. 257). Thus, empathy towards the other need not be compulsorily rooted within the objective of support and help; rather, it could also be encouraged by competition, rivalry and even self-preserving or selfish motives. Allot (1992) had opined, “Empathy was a neutral mode of perception, in the sense that it could be used in relation to enemies or potential enemies, family or friends, or simply as a mode of obtaining information” (p. 354). The link between empathic disposition and non-altruistic behavioural outcomes is observed not only within adults but also in children. Barnett and Thompson (1985) had suggested that children who present with an enhanced awareness of others’ feelings (cognitive empathy) but do not present with the tendency to share the feelings (affective empathy) “might be expected to be especially Machiavellian in his or her dealings with others” (p. 296). It might be emphasized at this point that cognitive and affective empathy is stressed upon in the discussions within this chapter. The strategic implications of empathy are wired within the evolutionary dimensions of empathy. Gierer (2000) had posited, “cognition-based empathy, perspective-taking linked to vicarious emotions, has evolved as a secondary effect of the evolution of strategic thought” (p. 577). The efficiency of all strategic thoughts and decisions depends upon a thorough understanding of the possible emotional and mental states of the others; such understanding allows for the prediction of the others’ behaviour and the analysis of the differential outcomes arising from such behaviour. According to Gierer (2000), “This is best achieved if representations of others are connected to one's own emotional centres. Therefore, the evolution of the human brain is assumed to have established the capability of representations with such linkages” (p. 577). The preceding ideation stresses on the competitive nature of empathic behaviour wherein humans struggle and compete with each other in order to survive as per the dictum “survival of the fittest” and empathic disposition presents as a weapon to be deployed in this war for survival. While the term “survival of the fittest” has often been used to describe Darwinian evolution, Darwin himself had not coined the term. In fact Darwin had stressed on the importance of sympathy as essential to evolutionary fitness; he had opined, “Species which are not social, such as lions and tigers, no doubt feel sympathy for the suffering of their own young, but not for that of any other animal. With mankind, selfishness, experience, and imitation, probably add, to the power of sympathy; for we are led by the hope of receiving good in return to perform acts of sympathetic kindness to others; and sympathy is much strengthened by habit. In however complex a manner this feeling may have originated, as it is one of high importance to all those animals which aid and defend one another, it will have been increased through natural selection; for those communities, which included the greatest number of the most sympathetic members, would flourish best, and rear the greatest number of offspring” (Darwin, 1871, p. 82). While Darwin had stressed on ‘sympathy,’ several scholars have posited that Darwin had actually used the word to describe what is known as empathy in recent times. Ekman (2010) opined that Darwin’s sympathy “today would be termed empathy, altruism, or compassion” (p. 557). Date: 2025 There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it. 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