“Pricing Game” for tacit collusion and Passive Investment

Kazuyuki Shimizu ()
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Kazuyuki Shimizu: Meiji University, School of Business Administration

Chapter Chapter 3 in ESG Investment, German Industrie 4.0, and Blockchain, 2026, pp 55-67 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract This paper aims to figure out the structural factors of tacit collusiontacit collusion from the perspective of the oligopolistic marketoligopolistic market. A two-step approach is adopted to analyze this phenomenon. As pricing mechanisms shift from traditional methods to computational algorithms, herein termed the “pricing game,” new forms of collusion are expected to emerge. First, game theorygame theory is applied toward an understanding of this unspoken collusion, which involves interaction between different parties. A potential new form of collusion is identified as having been created by information signals in the price networks. Second, firms are owned by overlapping sets of investors (passive investors), and their incentives to compete are thereby reduced. Investors are rapidly shifting their investment allocations from active to passive management (ETFETF; Exchange-Traded Funds), in response to the complexity of asset management and the excess liquidity from central banks around the industrial world. This trend has accelerated during the last decade. A potential solution for this situation may be found in family ownershipfamily ownership, as a countervailing power for healthy competition.

Keywords: Tacit collusion; Oligopoly; Pricing algorithmAlgorithm; Game theory; Passive and active investors (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2026
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:sprchp:978-981-95-6927-4_3

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DOI: 10.1007/978-981-95-6927-4_3

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