Criminal Compliance Incentives II: Compliance and Deferred Prosecution Agreements

Ruihua Chen
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Ruihua Chen: Peking University, Law School

Chapter Chapter 10 in An Introduction to Corporate Compliance, 2026, pp 311-347 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract Traditionally, whether in cases involving individual defendants or corporate entities, prosecutorial authorities in the United States have had three principal options for handling criminal cases: first, initiating a public prosecution; second, issuing a non-prosecution decision; and third, entering into a plea agreement or sentencing agreement with the defendant, whereby, on the basis of the defendant’s voluntary admission of guilt, the prosecutor recommends that the court impose a more lenient sentence.

Date: 2026
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:sprchp:978-981-95-7257-1_10

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DOI: 10.1007/978-981-95-7257-1_10

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