Games Under Uncertainty

Akio Matsumoto () and Ferenc Szidarovszky ()
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Akio Matsumoto: Chuo University
Ferenc Szidarovszky: Corvinus University

Chapter Chapter 10 in Game Theory and Its Applications, 2025, pp 135-147 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract In the previous chaptersGames under uncertainty we were dealing with games with complete informationComplete information and in the case of dynamic games perfect informationPerfect information was also assumed. Complete information refers to games when every player knows the strategy sets and payoff functions of all players, that is, all players have complete information about the game.

Date: 2025
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DOI: 10.1007/978-981-96-0590-3_10

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