Solutions Based on Characteristic Functions

Akio Matsumoto () and Ferenc Szidarovszky ()
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Akio Matsumoto: Chuo University
Ferenc Szidarovszky: Corvinus University

Chapter Chapter 11 in Game Theory and Its Applications, 2025, pp 151-177 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract In the cases of noncooperative gamesCharacteristic function Noncooperative game the players cannot or do not want to make binding agreements, so they select strategies independently of each other, and receive the corresponding payoffs. The Nash equilibriumNash equilibrium does not need agreement between the players, since at an equilibrium situation the interest of each player is to keep the equilibrium strategy, otherwise his payoff decreases. Each player considers his own selfish interest without any consideration to the other players. As the next simple example illustrates, the players can be able to increase their payoffs by cooperation.

Date: 2025
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DOI: 10.1007/978-981-96-0590-3_11

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