Repeated and Dynamic Games

Akio Matsumoto () and Ferenc Szidarovszky ()
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Akio Matsumoto: Chuo University
Ferenc Szidarovszky: Corvinus University

Chapter Chapter 9 in Game Theory and Its Applications, 2025, pp 113-134 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract In this chapter repeated and dynamic games will be discussed in which the players know the strategy sets and payoff functions of all players, that is, the game has complete informationComplete information. It is also assumed that at each time period each player knows the complete history of the game which consists of the past strategy selections and corresponding payoff values of all players. It means that the game also has perfect informationPerfect information.

Date: 2025
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DOI: 10.1007/978-981-96-0590-3_9

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