Information Asymmetry: Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard

Jaeyoung Sung
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Jaeyoung Sung: Ajou University

Chapter Chapter 17 in Contract Theory: Discrete- and Continuous-Time Models, 2023, pp 289-304 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract We study both discrete- and continuous-time contracting problems in the presence of adverse selection and moral hazard under fullFull commitment commitment. Our models suggest that the PPS for the agent of average talent is lower and the motivation for a riskier project is stronger under adverse selection and moral hazard, than they are under moral hazard alone.

Date: 2023
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:sprchp:978-981-99-5487-2_17

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DOI: 10.1007/978-981-99-5487-2_17

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