Butler’s Arguments for the Authority of Conscience

Toshinari Mizuno ()
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Toshinari Mizuno: Keio University and Takeda Mental Clinic

Chapter Chapter 5 in Joseph Butler, 2024, pp 57-77 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract How does Butler defend his view that conscience is supremely authoritative? According to Darwall[aut]Darwall, Stephen, Butler argues that “the authority of conscienceConscienceauthority of is a condition of the very possibility of an agent’s having reasons to act at all.” According to Millar, Butler defends his view by appealing to some general propositions regarding God’s design of human natureHuman nature. According to Wedgwood[aut]Wedgwood, Ralph, Butler defends his view from observations of human nature without appealing to any theological prepositions. This paper criticizes Darwall’s and Miller’s and Wedgwood’s[aut]Wedgwood, Ralph interpretations. Then I present a new interpretation that incorporates an element of Millar’s interpretation and an element of Wedgwood’s[aut]Wedgwood, Ralph explanation.

Date: 2024
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:sprchp:978-981-99-9903-3_5

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DOI: 10.1007/978-981-99-9903-3_5

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