Single-Period Examples

Jakša Cvitanić and Jianfeng Zhang
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Jakša Cvitanić: California Institute of Technology
Jianfeng Zhang: University of Southern California

Chapter Chapter 2 in Contract Theory in Continuous-Time Models, 2013, pp 7-14 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract In this chapter we consider simple examples in one-period models, whose continuous versions will be studied later in the book. Principal–Agent problems in single-period models become more tractable if exponential utility functions are assumed. However, even then, there are cases in which tractability requires considering only linear contracts. Optimal contracts which cannot contract upon the agent’s actions are more sensitive to the output than those that can. When the agents’ type is unknown to the principal, the agents of “higher” type may have to be paid more to make them reveal their type.

Keywords: Risk Aversion; Optimal Contract; Exponential Utility; Linear Contract; Hide Action (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:sprfcp:978-3-642-14200-0_2

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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-14200-0_2

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