Strategy and Conflict

Pierre Dehez ()

Chapter Chapter 2 in Game Theory for the Social Sciences, 2024, pp 7-95 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract The present chapter is devoted to non-cooperative games, games in which players are not bound by prior agreements. If prior agreements are possible, they are included in the strategies available to the players. Concept of Nash equilibrium.

Date: 2024
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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-031-58241-7_2

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