Bargaining and Consensus

Pierre Dehez ()

Chapter Chapter 3 in Game Theory for the Social Sciences, 2024, pp 97-126 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract The preceding chapter was concerned with non-cooperative situations although cooperation was not excluded. This is the approach initiated by Nash (1950).

Date: 2024
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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-031-58241-7_3

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