Kant-Nash Equilibria in a Quantity-Setting Oligopoly

Ngo Long

A chapter in Equilibrium Theory for Cournot Oligopolies and Related Games, 2016, pp 179-201 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract This paper studies oligopolistic equilibria when not all firms behave in a Nashian fashion. The Kantian firms act according to norms of behavior that reflect the Kantian categorical imperative. We introduce the concepts of Exclusive Kant-Nash Equilibrium and Inclusive Kant-Nash Equilibrium to study such situations. Our model formalises Sen’s conjecture that in actual situations people often do not follow the selfish strategy because of the Kantian norm of behavior.

Keywords: Interior Equilibrium; Equilibrium Output; Industry Output; Constant Marginal Cost; Equilibrium Profit (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:spschp:978-3-319-29254-0_12

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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-29254-0_12

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