On the Nash Equilibrium of Asymmetric Public-Good Contests

Takeshi Yamazaki ()
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Takeshi Yamazaki: Niigata University

A chapter in Equilibrium Theory for Cournot Oligopolies and Related Games, 2016, pp 269-279 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract In this paper we study a rent-seeking contest where several groups compete for a prize which is a public good among players in a group. In the contest players in a group may evaluate the prize of the contest differently. We prove that such an asymmetric public-good contest with a general contest success function possesses a unique pure-strategy Nash equilibrium, where the equilibrium is unique in the sense that the total expenditure of each group is uniquely determined. We also present some comparative statics in the model.

Keywords: Nash Equilibrium; Public Good; Production Function; Total Expenditure; Share Function (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:spschp:978-3-319-29254-0_16

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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-29254-0_16

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