On the Geometric Structure of the Cournot Equilibrium Set: The Case of Concave Industry Revenue and Convex Costs

Pierre von Mouche ()
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Pierre von Mouche: Wageningen UR

A chapter in Equilibrium Theory for Cournot Oligopolies and Related Games, 2016, pp 63-88 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract The recent results in von Mouche and Quartieri (Econ Bull 35(2):1299–1305, 2015) on equilibrium (semi-)uniqueness for homogeneous Cournot oligopolies with concave industry revenue and convex costs are refined and conceptualised. For this class of oligopolies also new results concerning the geometric structure of the equilibrium set E are provided. In particular, a subclass is identified for which E is a non-empty polytope on which the aggregator is constant and a subclass for which E is a 1-dimensional polytope on which the aggregator is injective.

Keywords: Cost Function; Equilibrium Uniqueness; Price Function; Interior Equilibrium; Equilibrium Existence (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:spschp:978-3-319-29254-0_6

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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-29254-0_6

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