Evolution, Cooperation, and Repeated Games

Eric Maskin

Chapter 4 in Games, Groups, and the Global Good, 2009, pp 79-84 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract I discuss recent work that characterizes what outcomes correspond to evolutionarily stable strategies in two-player symmetric repeated games when players have a positive probability of making a mistake.

Keywords: Positive Probability; Average Payoff; Stable Strategy; Mutant Strategy; Full Cooperation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:spschp:978-3-540-85436-4_4

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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-540-85436-4_4

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