Groups and Networks: Their Role in the Evolution of Cooperation

Brian Skyrms
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Brian Skyrms: University of California

Chapter 6 in Games, Groups, and the Global Good, 2009, pp 105-114 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract We study networks rather than groups, consider network ties as probabilistic rather than deterministic, and treat networks as dynamic rather than static. A dynamic model of network formation introduced in Skyrms and Pemantle (2000) is used to analyze paths to cooperation in Stag Hunt games and some versions of Prisoner’s Dilemma. Relative rates of evolution of structure and strategy are found to be crucial.

Keywords: Interaction Structure; Free Association; Voluntary Association; Learning Dynamic; Stag Hunter (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:spschp:978-3-540-85436-4_6

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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-540-85436-4_6

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