Games, Groups, Norms, and Societies

Simon Levin
Additional contact information
Simon Levin: Princeton University

Chapter 8 in Games, Groups, and the Global Good, 2009, pp 143-153 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract The origin and evolution of social norms, social institutions (including religions), and moral systems involve an interplay among processes played out on diverse scales of space, time, and complexity. Such norms, social institutions and systems (collectively referred to here as institutions) emerge from the collective actions of individuals, and feed back to influence those behaviors, but on much faster time scales than the institutions themselves change. In evolutionary biology, this is an example of what Raven (1980) termed “diffuse coevolution,” in which an evolutionary response is not to a single agent (tight coevolution), but rather is a diffuse response to a collection of agents (or species). Dealing with such multiple dimensions requires a new kind of game theory, not only multi-player but also multi-dimensional in other ways. Group formation and the resultant collective actions may lead to diffuse benefits for group members, but are sustained by individual decisions regarding costs and benefits within a social context. To sustain individual behaviors in the collective good, groups and societies develop explicit and implicit reward and punishment schemes, including moral systems. Understanding the interplay among these various players, operating on diverse scales, will require extension of game theoretical concepts to address dynamics on multiple scales, including analysis of meta-games, in which evolved strategies are diffuse responses to collections of situations.

Keywords: Pattern Formation; Slime Mold; Ultimatum Game; Fast Time Scale; Reciprocal Altruism (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:spschp:978-3-540-85436-4_8

Ordering information: This item can be ordered from
http://www.springer.com/9783540854364

DOI: 10.1007/978-3-540-85436-4_8

Access Statistics for this chapter

More chapters in Springer Series in Game Theory from Springer
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().