Introduction

Carlos Alós-Ferrer and Klaus Ritzberger

Chapter 1 in The Theory of Extensive Form Games, 2016, pp 1-15 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract This chapter introduces the subject—the theory of non-cooperative games in extensive form—sketches its history, and explains the motivation for the research summarized in this manuscript. It also discusses the particular approach—trees as sets of sets of plays—and its roots in the works of von Neumann and Morgenstern and Kuhn, and outlines the distinctive features of this approach as compared to other models from the literature. A few initial examples illustrate the structure and the benefits of the framework.

Keywords: Game Theory; Extensive Form; Sequence Approach; Stochastic Game; Maximal Chain (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:spschp:978-3-662-49944-3_1

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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-662-49944-3_1

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