Extensive Forms

Carlos Alós-Ferrer and Klaus Ritzberger

Chapter 5 in The Theory of Extensive Form Games, 2016, pp 99-130 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract This chapter turns to the concept of a (pure) strategy. More precisely, it characterizes EDPs that satisfy three basic desiderata: (A0) Every play can be induced by some strategy combination. (A1) Every strategy combination induces some play. (A2) The play induced by a given strategy combination is unique. While (A0) demands no further restrictions on the game tree, (A1) and (A2) hold for extensive forms if and only if the tree is weakly up-discrete, coherent, and regular. Since the characterizing properties are rather weak, this puts almost all models from the literature within the realm of “playable” games. The only exception concerns games in continuous time; those fail both (A1) and (A2).

Keywords: Pure Strategy; Extensive Form; Differential Game; Strategy Combination; Stochastic Game (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-662-49944-3_5

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