Introduction

Victor J. Tremblay and Carol Horton Tremblay
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Victor J. Tremblay: Oregon State University
Carol Horton Tremblay: Oregon State University

Chapter Chapter 1 in New Perspectives on Industrial Organization, 2012, pp 3-23 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract The field of industrial organization encompasses a host of intriguing questions. Why do cell phone companies charge a fixed fee for a given number of minutes and a high price for each additional minute? Why do firms produce a vast number of brands? If advertising persuades consumers to buy something, are they better off? If two large firms merge, is society better or worse off? What if one of the firms is failing? These are just a few of the questions that are addressed in the book.

Keywords: Nash Equilibrium; Game Theory; Industrial Organization; Behavioral Economic; Imperfect Competition (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:sptchp:978-1-4614-3241-8_1

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DOI: 10.1007/978-1-4614-3241-8_1

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