Dynamic Monopoly and Oligopoly Models

Victor J. Tremblay and Carol Horton Tremblay
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Victor J. Tremblay: Oregon State University
Carol Horton Tremblay: Oregon State University

Chapter Chapter 11 in New Perspectives on Industrial Organization, 2012, pp 283-310 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract Table 10.1 in the previous chapter identifies 12 classic models of oligopoly. In Chap. 10 we analyzed the static Cournot, Bertrand, and Cournot–Bertrand models. We also investigated the case where firms could choose whether to compete in output (as in Cournot) or price (as in Bertrand). These are labeled models M1–M4 in Table 10.1.

Keywords: Dominant Firm; Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium; Strategic Variable; Trigger Strategy; Cournot Model (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
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DOI: 10.1007/978-1-4614-3241-8_11

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