Cartels

Victor J. Tremblay and Carol Horton Tremblay
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Victor J. Tremblay: Oregon State University
Carol Horton Tremblay: Oregon State University

Chapter Chapter 9 in New Perspectives on Industrial Organization, 2012, pp 213-239 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract We have seen in previous chapters how equilibrium price is substantially higher in monopoly than in perfectly competitive markets. In this chapter, we begin to investigate how price and output are determined in oligopoly markets that lie between these polar extremes. There are two types of oligopoly models, those that assume cooperative behavior and those that assume noncooperative behavior. In this chapter, we focus on cooperative settings or cooperative games. In the next two chapters we discuss noncooperative models.

Keywords: Cartel Level; Antitrust Authority; Industry Profit; Trigger Strategy; Monopoly Profit (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:sptchp:978-1-4614-3241-8_9

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DOI: 10.1007/978-1-4614-3241-8_9

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